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1. Introduction. Repeated games with complete information are known to have multiple equilibria. The
prominent result in this direction is the folk theorem that asserts that in games with perfect monitoring and
perfectly rational players, every feasible and individually rational payoff can be sustained by an equilibrium of
the repeated game. A more realistic model to study involves games with imperfect monitoring, where players
imperfectly observe other players’ actions, and bounded rationality, where players have limited information
processing abilities.
The literature on games with imperfect monitoring seeks to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs (see,
e.g., Lehrer [21, 22], Abreu et al. [2], Fudenberg and Levine [14], Tomala [36], Renault and Tomala [29]),
and the literature on games with bounded rationality examines whether equilibrium payoffs of the unrestricted
repeated game can be approximated by equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game with bounded rationality (see,
e.g., Rubinstein [33], Abreu and Rubinstein [1], Kalai and Stanford [18], Lehrer [20, 23], Ben-Porath [6, 7],
Sabourian [34], Neyman [27], Gossner and Hernández [16, 17], Bavly and Neyman [5]). Typically, these two
problems have been studied separately in the literature. A notable exception is a recent paper by Cole and
Kocherlakota [11], where a parametric class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring is examined. These
authors study the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs, which are sustained by strongly symmetric strategies
with recall K—that is, equilibrium payoffs of the inﬁnitely repeated games obtained by ﬁnite recall strategies.
They show that, for some speciﬁcations of the parameters, for large K this set of equilibrium is equal to the
whole set of equilibrium payoffs.
The present paper also aims at blending these two approaches by considering equilibria of the repeated game
where each player is restricted to ﬁnite recall strategies. Because the problem is quite difﬁcult when dealt with
in its generality, as a ﬁrst step in this direction, we analyze a minority game. In this class of games each player
has two actions and aims at choosing the action that is less popular among all players. The game is repeated,
and after each stage the most popular (or equivalently the less popular) action is publicly announced.
Attention to phenomena where it is advantageous to be in the minority is present in some papers by
Arthur [3, 4]. Motivated by his ideas, a whole literature developed, especially in journals of theoretical physics.
The reader is referred to the recent books by Challet et al. [10] and Coolen [12] for a history of the problem,
its statistical-mechanics analysis, and some applications to ﬁnancial markets.
If the analysis of minority games started considering situations involving a huge number of players, some
models with a small number of players capture interesting phenomena and require a strategic analysis. For
instance, consider the case where each of three agents can satisfactorily carry out a procedure only if a minimal
throughput is obtained via a communication link. They can choose one of two links, and the minimal throughput
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is guaranteed only if one of the agents uses that link alone. This is often the case when downloading data in
peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (see, e.g., Suri et al. [35]).
Renault et al. [30] are the ﬁrst to consider a minority game from a strategic viewpoint. They prove an
undiscounted folk theorem for this game. In particular, they construct a uniform equilibrium where the payoff
of each player is zero. It is interesting to notice that a folk theorem exists for this game even if no identiﬁability
condition à la Fudenberg et al. [15] holds. Discounted and ﬁnitely repeated versions of the minority game are
studied by Renault et al. [31].
In the present paper, a three-player minority game with imperfect public monitoring and bounded recall is
studied, and only pure strategies are considered. Bounded recall and public signal are typical assumptions for
minority games in the physics literature. We ﬁrst analyze public equilibria. Public strategy proﬁle in those games
can be represented as the choice of a subgraph in a de Bruijn graph, together with a coloring of the vertices, i.e.,
a rule that assigns each vertex to a player. Using these tools, we compute some equilibria. Other authors have
used de Bruijn graphs and sequences to model behaviors with bounded recall: See, e.g., Challet and Marsili [9],
Piccione and Rubinstein [28], Gossner and Hernández [16, 17], and Liaw and Liu [25].
We look, then, at the asymptotic behavior of the set of bounded-recall equilibrium payoffs. For any game
with bounded recall and imperfect public monitoring, the set of public equilibria with bounded recall is a subset
of the set of public equilibria with unbounded recall, and the set of public-equilibrium payoffs increases with
the size of the recall. However, for some games it may not converge to the set of unbounded-recall public-
equilibrium payoffs. For instance, consider a repeated game with a public blank signal. Because players have
no information, the set of unbounded-recall equilibrium payoffs is the convex hull of stage-Nash payoffs. In the
game with bounded recall and public strategies, the public memory is always empty, so players always choose
the same action and bounded-recall public equilibria are nothing but stage-Nash equilibria. Other examples of
games where convergence fails, even under perfect monitoring, can be found in a earlier version of this paper
(Renault et al. [32]).
For the minority game, we show that the set of public-equilibrium payoffs does converge to the set of
unbounded-recall public-equilibrium payoffs as the length of recall increases.
The set of private equilibria lacks the nice properties of public equilibria, and we exhibit a private equilibrium
with recall 3 whose payoff does not lie in the set of unbounded-recall private-equilibrium payoffs. These results
are somehow connected to Mailath et al. [26] and Kandori and Obara [19], who also compare public and
private equilibria, but, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst that considers such a comparison in
a bounded-recall framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model of repeated games with imperfect public
monitoring and bounded recall. Section 3 gives the main results for public equilibria. Section 4 deals with private
equilibria.
2. Repeated games with public signals.
2.1. Description of the model. Consider a stage game
G= N  A
i i N  g
i i N   (2.1)
In this setting N is a set of players, for each i  N; Ai is the set of actions available to player i; A =  i N Ai is
the set of action proﬁles; and the map gi  A   is the payoff function for player i. Denote by g  A  N the
vector payoff function  gi i N. For every i   N, put A i =  j N j =i Aj; therefore, a i   A i will be a shortcut
for  aj  j  = i     j N j =i Aj. Consider, then, a set of signals U and a mapping    A   U. In the whole paper
the sets N, Ai, and U are assumed to be nonempty and ﬁnite.
This game is repeated over time. At each round t = 1 2         players choose actions, and if at   A is the
action proﬁle at stage t, they observe a public signal ut =  at  before proceeding to the next stage. The set of
histories of length t  0 for player i is  i
t  = Ai  U t,  i
0 being a singleton, and  i =
 
t 0 i
t is the set of all
histories for player i.
When U = A and   is the identity mapping on A, each player fully observes the action proﬁle. When the
function   is constant, no player receives information on the action proﬁle. These two cases will be referred to
as perfect monitoring and trivial monitoring, respectively.
A strategy for player i is a mapping  i   i  Ai. The set of strategies for player i is denoted by  i, and similar
conventions are adopted as for actions:   =  j N  j,   i =  j N j =i  j. A proﬁle of strategies   =   i i NRenault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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generates a unique history  at    ut    t 1    A   U  , where for each t, ut    =   at    . In the whole
paper only pure strategies are considered.
Given a strategy proﬁle  , the average payoff for player i up to time T is  i
T   = 1/T 
 T
t=1gi at    , and
 i   =limT   i
T    when the limit exists;
Let    be the inﬁnitely repeated game. The next deﬁnition recalls the concept of uniform equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A strategy proﬁle   is a uniform equilibrium of    if
(a) for all i  N,  i    exists;
(b) for all   >0 there exists T0 such that for all T  T0, for all i  N, for all  i   i,  i
T  i,   i   i
T   + .
Denote by E  the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs of   , i.e., the set of vectors   i    i N, where   is a
uniform equilibrium of   .
2.2. Public strategies.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let i   N. The strategy  i    i is called public if for all t   1, and for all histories of
length t, h= ai
1 u1        ai
t, ut  and h  = bi
1 v1        bi
t vt ,
  s   1        t   u
i
s =v
i
s  =   
i h = 
i h
   
In other words, a public strategy depends only on public signals. The set of public strategies of player i is
denoted by    i. A strategy proﬁle   is a public equilibrium if it is a uniform equilibrium and each player’s strategy
is public. The corresponding set of equilibrium payoffs is denoted by   E . In the case of perfect monitoring, any
strategy is public, because the public history contains all the past.
In repeated games with unbounded recall, every pure strategy is equivalent to a public strategy. Knowing her
own strategy and the history of public signals, a player can deduce the actions she played in the past (see, e.g.,
Tomala [36]). More precisely, for every  i    i, there exists    i      i such that for all   i     i and for each
stage t, at  i   i =at    i   i .
An immediate corollary of this is that   E  =E .
To emphasize the dependence on the player’s own past actions, a strategy that is not public will be called
private. As will be seen in the sequel, in games with bounded recall, considering public or private strategies
makes a big difference.
2.3. Bounded recall. Consider now players who recall only recent observations. Informally, a strategy has
recall k if the player who uses it remembers only what happened on the k previous stages, and plays in a
stationary way, i.e., this player has no clock and relies on her recall, but not on time. The formal deﬁnition is
the following.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Given an integer k    , the strategy  i    i has recall k if there exists a mapping
f   Ai  U k  Ai such that for all t  k and for all histories h= ai
1 u1        ai
t ut   i
t,
 
i h =f a
i
t k+1 ut k+1        a
i
t ut  
By convention, a strategy that has recall 0 is a constant mapping on  i.
Lehrer [20] and Bavly and Neyman [5] use a somewhat different deﬁnition: In those papers, a bounded-
recall strategy is the choice of an initial recall plus the mapping f. This implies that whenever the initial recall
reappears during the course of the game, the player will play in the same way as at early stages. In the deﬁnition
given here, a player plays as she wishes before stage k and then uses the stationary rule f. We believe that
asymptotic results are unlikely to differ using one or another deﬁnition, however, for small values of k, the
initialization phase might be critical. Also, note that Sabourian [34] uses the same deﬁnition as the one given
above.
The set of strategies for player i that have recall k is denoted by  i
k and  k  =  i N  i
k. Because the game
is ﬁnite, for each      k, the sequence at    is eventually periodic, i.e., periodic from some stage on, which
implies the existence of  i   . The normal form game  k =  N   i
k    i   is thus well deﬁned and the set of
Nash equilibrium payoffs of  k in pure strategies is denoted by Ek.
Let    i
k =    i  i
k be the set of public strategies with recall k,    k = N     i
k    i   be the public-strategy game
with recall k, and   Ek be the set of its (pure) Nash equilibrium payoffs.
Remark 2.1. In games with bounded recall, considering public strategies is a true restriction. As mentioned
before, every pure strategy  i is equivalent to a public strategy    i, but the bounded-recall property is not
preserved. It might be that  i has recall k but    i does not. For example, consider trivial monitoring (the mapping
  is constant). Given any recall k, there is only one history of public signals; thus, a public strategy with boundedRenault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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recall is a constant strategy. By contrast, a private strategy (of recall 1) can simply alternate between two actions.
The equivalent public strategy alternates between the two actions according to time and thus is not a public
strategy with bounded recall according to Deﬁnition 2.3.
Remark 2.2. In the game with recall 0, strategies are constant and thus   E0 =E0. This set further coincides
with the set of pure Nash equilibrium payoffs of the stage game.
Remark 2.3. All the equilibrium notions deﬁned in this section might well be empty because we are dealing
with pure strategies. However, when the stage game has a pure Nash equilibrium, playing this equilibrium at
each stage regardless of history is an equilibrium of the repeated game in any sense deﬁned above: uniform,
k-recall public, k-recall private. The rest of the paper deals mainly with the minority game, which has pure Nash
equilibria.
The following general lemma will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 2.1. (a) If a strategy proﬁle   is an equilibrium of    k, then   is a uniform equilibrium of   . Thus,
  Ek  E .
(b) If a strategy proﬁle   is an equilibrium of    k, then   is an equilibrium of  k. Thus,   Ek  Ek.
(c) If a strategy proﬁle   is an equilibrium of    k, then   is an equilibrium of    k+1. Thus,   Ek     Ek+1.
Proof. (a) This kind of result is common in the literature on games with bounded complexity (see, e.g.,
Neyman [27], Ben-Porath [7], Lehrer [20, 23]) and relies on a usual dynamic programming argument. Let   be an
equilibrium of    k. For each player i, ﬁnding a best reply in  i to   i amounts to solving a dynamic programming
problem, where the state space is U k, the set of public histories of length k; the action space is Ai, the payoff
in state h =  u1        uk  given action ai is gi ai   i h  ; and the new state is  u2        uk   ai   i h   .
It is well known (see Blackwell [8]) that there exists a stationary optimal strategy. Thus, the best reply of
player i to a proﬁle of public strategies with recall k is a public strategy with recall k (see Abreu and Rubinstein
[1, Lemma 1]). Therefore,   is a uniform equilibrium of   .
(b) This follows directly from the previous point. The game    k is a subgame of  k in the sense that the set
of strategies of each player in    k is a subset of the set of strategies of this player in  k. Then let   be a strategy
proﬁle in    k if   is not an equilibrium of  k, then a player i has a proﬁtable deviation in  i
k    i; thus,   is
not a uniform equilibrium, contradicting the previous point.
(c) The argument is similar to the one used for point (b),    k is a subgame of    k+1: Any strategy with recall k
can be played in the game with recall k+1. Therefore, if a strategy proﬁle   in    k is not an equilibrium of    k+1,
then some player i has a proﬁtable deviation in    i
k+1    i; thus,   is not a uniform equilibrium contradicting
point (a).  
2.4. The repeated minority game. In the minority game (MG) three players have to choose, simultaneously,
one of two rooms: L (left) or R (right). For each proﬁle of action a= a1 a2 a3   L R 3, call minority room
the less crowded room and majority room the more crowed room. Player i’s payoff is then one if she chooses the
minority room and zero otherwise. Hence, the payoff matrix of the MG is as follows, where player 1 chooses
the row, player 2 the column, and player 3 the matrix.
L R
L 0 0 0 0 1 0
R 1 0 0 0 0 1
L
L R
L 0 0 1 1 0 0
R 0 1 0 0 0 0
R
The proﬁle where one player chooses L and the two other players choose R is a Nash equilibrium. All pure
Nash equilibria of this game are obtained by permutation of players and rooms. Denote by C the convex hull
of payoff vectors generated by these equilibria. If e i     3 is the vector whose ith component is one and the
other components are zero, then
C =conv e i   i   1 2 3  =
 
x   0 1 
3 
3  
i=1
x
i =1
 
 
It is worth noticing that this is also the set of Pareto-efﬁcient payoffs in the game.
Consider now the repeated game where the majority room is publicly observed. At each stage t = 1 2       ,
players choose their room, and before stage t +1, the majority room is publicly announced: U = L R , and
  a =
 
 
 
L if # i  ai =L  2 
R if # i  ai =R  2 Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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The rest of the paper deals with the repeated minority game with these public signals. The following folk-
theoremlike result holds.
Proposition 2.1. In the minority game, E  =C.
Proof. This follows directly from the characterization given in Tomala [36, Theorem 5.1, p. 104], but we
provide a simple direct proof. First note that because C is the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the
one-shot game, then C   E . Given any point x in C, one can ﬁnd a sequence of Nash equilibria  at t of the
minority game, such that the average payoff vector along this sequence converges to x. Then, the strategy proﬁle
such that for each player i and stage t, player i plays ai
t at stage t irrespective of the history, is clearly a uniform
equilibrium with payoff x.
To get the converse inclusion, note that there are two types of action proﬁles: Either two players are in the
same room and the proﬁle is an equilibrium of the MG, or the three players are in the same room. In the latter
case, each player has a proﬁtable deviation (she prefers to switch rooms), and further, this deviation does not
change the majority room, i.e., the public signal. If at a strategy proﬁle the three players are in the same room
on a nonnegligible set of stages, then player 1 can switch rooms at these stages. This increases her payoff at
these stages without affecting public signals, hence, without affecting the behavior of the other players. Such a
strategy proﬁle cannot be a uniform equilibrium, and therefore E   C.  
3. Main results.
3.1. Public equilibria and de Bruijn graphs. Here we give a combinatorial representation of k-recall
strategies using de Bruijn graphs. We consider a directed graph Tk, where each of the 2k nodes is labeled by a
k-letter word written with the alphabet  L R . For i    1        k , let xi    L R . The word x =  x1        xk 
precedes the word y =  y1        yk  if  x2        xk  =  y1        yk 1 . The word y succeeds x whenever x pre-
cedes y. Hence, each node (i.e., the word associated with it) precedes only two nodes. Such a graph is called
a de Bruijn graph (see, e.g., de Bruijn [13] and Yoeli [37] for some properties of these graphs). The following
ﬁgure (Figure 1) shows a de Bruijn graph T3 based on sequences written with the alphabet  L R .
A proof of the following result can be found in Yoeli [37] (see Lempel [24] for a generalization to any ﬁnite
alphabet).
Proposition 3.1. For every p in  1        2k , there exists in the de Bruijn graph Tk a cycle with length p.
The link with public strategies is the following. Let   =   1  2  3  be a k-recall strategy proﬁle,  at    t
the induced sequence of action proﬁles, and  ut    t the induced sequence of public signals. We denote by
xt 1 =  ut k           ut 1     the public memory before stage t. Let f i   L R k    L R  be the mapping
associated to  i and set f = f 1 f 2 f 3 . The mapping f associates with every public memory x   L R k the
next action proﬁle. From stage k on, the play of the game is perfectly determined by f—that is, f xt 1 =at   
for each t >k.
The sequence  xt t is eventually periodic: There exist two integers t0 and p such that xt+p =xt,  t  t0. The
payoff associated with   is thus the average payoff over a period:
 
i   =
1
p
t0+p  
t=t0+1
g
i f xt   
Let us call a cycle of   a tuple  xt+1        xt+p  with t  t0.
LLL
LLR LRR
RRR RLR LRL
RRL RLL
Figure 1. de Bruijn graph T3.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Lemma 3.1. If   is a public equilibrium of  k, then for each x in the cycle of  , f x  is a Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game.
Proof. Otherwise, there is an x in the cycle of   such that f x = L L L  (or = R R R ). Then player 1
deviates and plays R (or L) whenever the public memory is x, and plays like  1 otherwise. This deviation does
not affect the sequence of public signals, and thus does not affect the behavior of other players. It is proﬁtable
because at least once every p stages, the player collects a payoff of one instead of zero.  
Thanks to this lemma, we can restrict our attention to mappings f that map public memories (i.e.,  L R k) to
Nash equilibria of the one-shot game. Notice now that a Nash equilibrium of the minority game is fully described
by (i) the player who gets 1 and (ii) the majority room. That is, to specify the mapping f, we must attach to
each public memory (i) a winning player and (ii) the next public signal. We can thus describe a strategy proﬁle
in the de Bruijn graphs by selecting one outgoing edge for each node and by coloring the nodes: Each node is
assigned to a player, or to nobody if the players are all in the same room. As we said before, in equilibrium
every node is assigned to a player.
Note that a node is assigned to player i when she is the winning player. Therefore, if she changes action at
this node, ﬁrst, she gets a bad payoff, and second, she does not change the public signal. A deviation of player i
can thus be regarded as an alternative choice of an outgoing edge at each node that is not assigned to her.
To sum up, a public equilibrium in the k-recall game can be described as follows: for each node of Tk, one
outgoing edge and one player are chosen in such a way that no player i can induce a more proﬁtable cycle in
the graph by changing outgoing edges at nodes not assigned to her.1
3.2. Some public equilibria. We now describe some public-equilibrium payoffs.
Lemma 3.2. (a) For any k  0,  k/ k+1  1/ k+1  0     Ek.
(b) For any k  2,   k 2 /k 1/k 1/k     Ek.
(c) For any k  2,   k 2 /k 2/k 0     Ek.
The following notation and terminology will be used in the sequel.
L
p =L···L       
p times
  R
q =R···R       
q times
 
Call word any ﬁnite sequence of signals. Given two words u= u1        up  and v = v1        vq , denote by uv
the concatenated word uv = u1        up v1        vq .
Consider the minority game with recall k, and its associated de Bruijn graph Tk. Call m-cycle a cycle of
length m, and call stable the cycles where all the nodes have the same number of Ls. Among the stable cycles
having s Ls, say, call main all the cycles containing the nodes LsRk s or Rk sLs. In Tk there are k   1 main
k-cycles and 2 main 1-cycles.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. (a) Consider the  k+1 -cycle that contains Rk and all the nodes whose label contains
just one L. In equilibrium, players cycle on this  k + 1 -cycle, and elsewhere they go to this cycle as fast as
possible, i.e., through a shortest path in the graph.
Assign node Rk to player 2 and all the other nodes in the graph to player 1.
Player 1 can deviate only on Rk, and she has no incentive to do it, because that would induce a cycle on
the node Rk that is assigned to player 2. Player 2 can deviate anywhere else, but she has no incentive to do it,
because she cannot ﬁnd a cycle that contains Rk and is shorter than the equilibrium cycle.
Player 3 can always deviate, but because she would get a zero payoff anyway, she has no incentive to deviate.
Figure 2 shows the above equilibrium for k =3.
(b) For every s    1        k  assign nodes Rk sLs to player 2, nodes Lk sRs to player 3, and the other nodes
to player 1. In equilibrium players cycle on the main k-cycles, and elsewhere they move to the closest main
cycle.
Assume, for instance, that we start with the memory Lk. The closest main k-cycle is the cycle of nodes that
contain only one R, i.e., the cycle
L
k 1R L
k 2RL L
k 3RL
2        LRL
k 2 RL
k 1 L
k 1R      
1 As an anonymous referee pointed out, this representation does not account for the initial stages. However, these stages are inessential for
public equilibria. By playing altogether the same action, the players can enforce any initial public memory, and we may assume that the
game starts anywhere in the graph.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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1
1
1
1 1
1
1
2
LLL
LLR LRR
RRR RLR LRL
RLL RRL
Figure 2. Equilibrium with 3-recall and payoff  
3
4 
1
4 0 .
Remark that all nodes are assigned to player 1 except Lk 1R and RLk 1. Assume that player 1 deviates at
node Lk 1R. The next node is Lk 2R2, which is not assigned to her. If she deviates again, the next node is still
not assigned to her, and so on. Thus, her only possibility to collect payoffs is to stop deviating and follow the
equilibrium. Indeed, when player 1 is at a node not assigned to her, under the equilibrium strategy she will be
winning at the next k 2 nodes, whereas if she deviates she will spend more time in nodes where she gets zero.
More generally, consider a node where player 1 could possibly deviate, namely, the nodes assigned either to
player 2 or to player 3. One can check that,
(i) any deviation in a node not assigned to player 1 leads to another node not assigned to player 1;
(ii) the shortest path from a node not assigned to player 1 to the closest node assigned to player 1 is via
an equilibrium path, the shortest path from that latter node to the closest node assigned to player 1 is via an
equilibrium path, and so on.
Therefore, any nonequilibrium cycle that is forced by player 1 with a ﬁnite sequence of deviations is longer
than k, and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to player 1 cannot be larger than  k   2 /k. Thus,
there is no ﬁnite sequence of deviations that would make player 1 better off.
For instance, if k =3 (see Figure 3), deviating in LLL (respectively, RRR) would force the 1-cycle LLL     
(respectively, RRR      ). Deviating in LLR (respectively, RRL) would increase the distance to the next 1-node
from one to at least three, hence the deviation would be proﬁtable only if it induced a 5-cycle with two nodes
assigned to player 1, but this is not possible because player 1 cannot deviate on her own nodes. Deviating in
RLL (respectively LRR) would increase the distance to the next 1-node from two to at least three. Using the
same argument as before, we can see that this deviation is not proﬁtable.
The argument is similar for the other players. Consider now a node where player 2 could possibly deviate,
namely, the nodes assigned either to player 1 or to player 3. It is not difﬁcult to verify that
(i) any deviation in a node not assigned to player 2 leads to another node not assigned to player 2,
(ii) the shortest path from a node not assigned to player 2 to the closest node assigned to player 2 is via an
equilibrium path, the shortest path from that node to the closest node assigned to player 2 is via an equilibrium
path, and so on.
Therefore any nonequilibrium cycle that is forced by player 2 with a ﬁnite sequence of deviations is longer
than k, and the proportion of nodes in this cycle assigned to player 2 cannot be larger than 1/k.
By symmetry, the argument for player 3 is the same.
(c) As above just assign to player 2 the nodes that were assigned to player 3, and repeat the argument. For
the case k =3, see Figure 4.  
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Figure 3. Equilibrium with 3-recall and payoff  
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Figure 4. Equilibrium with 3-recall and payoff  
1
3 
2
3 0 .
Remark 3.1. Deﬁne the effective recall of a strategy as the smallest k for which this strategy has recall k. In
our equilibrium constructions, the effective recalls of the three players are different. For instance, when k =3, in
the equilibrium of Lemma 3.2(a) the effective recalls of the three players are zero, zero, and three, respectively.
In fact, player 1 always plays L, player 2 always plays R. In (b) the recalls are 1, 3, and 3, and in (c) they
are 1, 2, and 3. An open question is whether in the game with recall k there exists an equilibrium payoff such
that in every equilibrium yielding this payoff, each player has effective recall k (this question was raised by an
anonymous referee).
The partial results of Lemma 3.2 enable us to completely describe the set of public-equilibrium payoffs for
small values of k.
Proposition 3.2. (a)   E0 =  1 0 0   0 1 0   0 0 1  .
(b)   E1 =   E0    
1
2 
1
2 0   
1
2 0 
1
2   0 
1
2 
1
2  .
(c)   E2 =   E1    
1
3 
2
3 0   
1
3 0 
2
3   0 
1
3 
2
3   
2
3 
1
3 0   
2
3 0 
1
3   0 
2
3 
1
3  .
Note that for k   2, all public-equilibrium payoffs are on the boundary of the triangle C. A direct conse-
quence of Lemma 3.2 is that  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3     E3, so when the recall is k  3 there exists a public-equilibrium payoff
in the interior of C. See Figure 5.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (a) By Remark 2.2, the only possible Nash equilibria of   E0 are repetitions of
the same Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
(b) By Lemma 2.1(c),   E0     E1. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.2(a) the payoffs  
1
2 
1
2 0 ,  
1
2 0 
1
2 ,  0 
1
2 
1
2     E1.
No other equilibrium payoff can be obtained with recall 1, because the maximal length of a cycle in the de Bruijn
graph T1 is two.
(c) By Lemma 2.1(c),   E1     E2. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.2(a) the payoffs  
1
3 
2
3 0 ,  
1
3 0 
2
3 ,  0 
1
3 
2
3 ,
 
2
3 
1
3 0 ,  
2
3 0 
1
3 ,  0 
2
3 
1
3     E2.
The only other possible payoffs with recall 2 are  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3 ,  
1
2 
1
4 
1
4  and its permutations, and  
3
4 
1
4 0  and
its permutations. We show now that none of these payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium.
First we prove that  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3       E2. In fact, the maximal length of a cycle in the de Bruijn graph T2 is four.
Hence, in order to obtain such a payoff in equilibrium, the players would have to cycle on a 3-cycle of T2, and
each node should be assigned to a different player. There are only two such cycles. Take, for instance, the cycle
LL   LR   RL, and assume that these nodes are assigned to players 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Then player 2
deviating in RL induces the cycle LR RL LR      and gets a payoff of
1
2. An analogous argument can be
used for the cycle LR RR RL.
LL
LR
RR
RL
Figure 5. de Bruijn graph T2.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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We claim now that the payoff  
1
2 
1
4 
1
4  (or its permutations) cannot be obtained at equilibrium. Consider the
only 4-cycle in the graph T2, namely, LL   LR   RR   RL. This cycle cannot give a payoff  
1
2 
1
4 
1
4  or
its permutations. In fact, if we let  i1 i2 i3 i4  denote the strategy proﬁle that assigns LL to player i1, LR to
player i2, RR to player i3, and RL to player i4, then none of the conﬁgurations that give a payoff  
1
2 
1
4 
1
4  is an
equilibrium:
•  1 1 2 3  is not an equilibrium, because player 3 would deviate in LR;
•  1 2 1 3  is not an equilibrium, because player 3 would deviate in LR, and player 2 would deviate in RL;
•  2 1 3 1  is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in LR, and player 3 would deviate in RL.
All other possible cases are obtained by permuting rooms and players.
The above cycle cannot give the payoff  
3
4 
1
4 0  or its permutations, either. Using the same notation as before,
•  1 1 1 2  is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in LR,
•  1 1 2 1  is not an equilibrium, because player 2 would deviate in RL.
As before, the other possible cases are obtained by permuting rooms and players.  
3.3. Convergence of ˆ Ek. We use the standard notion of Hausdorff convergence of closed sets and get the
following convergence result.
Theorem 3.1. In the minority game limk +    Ek = E  = C; that is, for every   > 0, there exists k0 such
that for each x in C and each k  k0, there exists y     Ek such that  x y   .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let m   2 be an integer and let Cm be the set of vectors of x   C with rational
components of the form xi = mi/m with mi   2 integers. The Cms are nonempty for m   6. Although this
sequence of sets is not increasing for inclusion, it is clear that Cm converges to C as m goes to inﬁnity, i.e.,
supx C infy Cm  x  y  goes to zero as m goes to inﬁnity. Therefore, Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemma 2.1(c)
and from Lemma 3.3 below.  
Lemma 3.3. For every integer m 2 and K  2m, Cm     Ek for k =Km.
Remark 3.2. This lemma shows that the whole payoff set is covered up to errors of order 1/m by ﬁnite
recall equilibrium payoffs with k = O m2 , so that given m, a polynomial capacity of recall is sufﬁcient. We
thank a referee for this observation.
The strategy construction is in a folk-theorem spirit. First the right payoff is obtained by playing an adapted
main path. In case of a detected deviation, punishments have to be performed. Because of ﬁnite recall, the
evidence that a deviation occurred may disappear from the recall. To get a deviating player to be punished
forever, players are asked to periodically rewrite a word in the public recall, indicating that a deviation has
occurred and which actions should be used to punish. This construction relies heavily on properties of the
minority game and the majority room as a signal. The following properties will be used extensively.
• A player who is in the minority room at some stage cannot change the signal at that stage. This implies
that a player who gets a payoff of one at a given stage has no incentive to deviate at that stage because it can
only decrease the stage payoff and has no impact whatsoever on the future.
• The main path is constructed so that at each stage a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is played.
Thus, at each stage there is one player in the minority room and the other two players are in the majority room,
both receiving a payoff of zero. If the signal changes, that means that one of the two players in the majority
room deviated, but the public signal does not tell who did. A simple way to punish the deviating player without
knowing her identity is to apply the following policy: “If I see a wrong signal at stage t, then I remain in the
room where I was at stage t.” This insures that the deviating player, who was in the majority room when the
deviation was detected, remains in the majority room as long as the punishment phase lasts.
• Two players can write any word in the public recall, whatever the behavior of the third player is.
• Each payoff vector of the one-shot game is obtained by exactly two actions proﬁles. These two proﬁles
yield different public signals because they can be deduced from each other by permuting rooms.
The following terminology will be used in the proof of Lemma 3.3. A word of length k is called a public
recall. Given a public recall M, a word u of length l   k is called a subword of M if there exist two words
v w (possibly of length 0) such that M = vuw. The word consisting of L      L, q times is denoted Lq. If u is
a subword of M, deﬁne the position of u in M as the rank of the ﬁrst letter of u. For instance, if M begins
with u, then u has position 1; if M ends with u, then u has position k l+1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let m   2 be an integer. Pick a point x =  xi i   Cm. Then x =
 
i xie i , where for
each i   N, xi = mi/m, with mi   2, so xi   2/m. The aim is to construct a strategy proﬁle   with payoff x,
which is an equilibrium of    k for k =Km, with K  2m.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Let H = a 
1        a 
m  Am be a sequence of action proﬁles of length m such that
(i) the average payoff along H is
x =
1
m
m  
t=1
g a
 
t  
(ii) the public history    a 
1           a 
m   associated with H is Lm.
Such a sequence exists: It sufﬁces to play a sequence of Nash equilibria of the MG such that player i gains one
exactly mi times, and the majority room is always L.
For each room r    L R , let ¯ r be the other room, and if a is an action proﬁle, let ¯ a be the action proﬁle
where every player has switched rooms. Let   H   Am be the sequence obtained from H by switching rooms:
  H = ¯ a 
1         ¯ a 
m . The main path will be the periodic repetition of the sequence H   H. Here is how to construct
a proﬁle of strategies of recall k that generates this periodic sequence of action proﬁles.
Let W  = Lm be the word induced by H. A word w is a subword of W if w = Lq with 0   q   m. If a
periodic repetition of H   H is played, at each stage the public recall ends by a word of the type   Ww or W   w
with w subword of W (possibly of length 0). Call such words end words. An end-word writes either LmRq or
RmLq, 0   q < m. The aim is to play a periodic repetition of H   H. To do that, at each stage knowledge of the
end word is sufﬁcient to know what action proﬁle should be played at the next stage. Thus, letting E be the set
of end words, there exists a mapping f that maps E to pure Nash equilibria of the MG, and such that for each
end word e, f e = f i e  i N is the action proﬁle that follows e in the periodic repetition of H   H.
Now consider deviations. After each end word e, f e  should be played. On the main path f e  induces a
winning player i e  and a signal r e . If ¯ r e  is observed, then some player j  = i e  has deviated. Let us call
deviation word a word of the type e¯ r e : A deviation word writes either LmRqL or RmLqR, 0   q < m. If a
deviation word e¯ r e  appears in the recall, the strategy prescribes to keep playing f e  as long as the position
of e¯ r e  is greater than 2m. During this punishing phase the signal is completely controlled by the punished
player; hence, this player could write in the recall another deviation word e  ¯ r e  . To prevent other end words
from appearing in the recall, if Lm 1 (respectively, Rm 1) appears, all players must play R (respectively, L).
Finally, when the position of e¯ r e  becomes less than or equal to 2m, the players must rewrite this word in the
recall by all playing the same actions for an appropriate number of times.
The exact deﬁnition of the strategy proﬁle   is given now.
• Initialization. At the ﬁrst m stages each player plays L. For the next m stages, each player plays R, for
the next m stages each player plays L, and so on until stage k.
• Main path. If the recall contains no deviation word and ends by the end word e, each player i plays f i e .
• Early punishments.
—If the recall contains a deviation word e¯ r e  whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall does
not end by Lm 1 or by Rm 1, then each player i plays f i e .
—If the recall contains a deviation word e¯ r e  whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall ends
by Lm 1, then each player i plays R.
—If the recall contains a deviation-word e¯ r e  whose position is greater than 2m, and if the recall ends
by Rm 1, then each player i plays L.
• Late punishments. If the recall contains a deviation word e¯ r e  = LmRqL with 0   q < m, let p be its
position.
—If m<p  2m, then each player i plays L.
—If m q <p  m, then each player i plays R.
—If p =m q, then each player i plays L.
Proceed similarly for e¯ r e =RmLqR.
• Other memories. For all other memories, each player plays L.
It remains to prove that the above-deﬁned strategy proﬁle   has payoff x and is an equilibrium of    k.
If all players play this strategy, the public recall after stage k is either LmRm···LmRm or LmRm···LmRmLm,
depending on the parity of K. It ends by an end word e and contains no deviation word. The next action proﬁle
is then f e  and the public recall still ends by an end word, so the strategy uses f again. By construction of f,
this strategy proﬁle generates the periodic repetition of H   H and the payoff is indeed x.
Suppose that player i deviates. First, player i cannot modify the signals in the initialization phase, and because
this phase is transient, it is irrelevant for payoffs. We thus consider deviations at later stages.
If the deviation never changes the signals, then player i changes action only at stages where she was in the
minority room. Therefore, she loses payoff at these stages and does not affect the behavior of other players.
Such a deviation is thus not proﬁtable.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Suppose now that player i changes the signal at some stage, therefore i is in the majority room at this stage.
This generates a deviation word e¯ r e . As long as the position of e¯ r e  is greater than 2m, the other players
play f e , so player i receives a payoff of zero unless if she generates words of the type Lm 1 or Rm 1. In such
cases, the other players will play both R or both L. Such situations appear, at most, every m stages. Therefore,
the only opportunities to player i to gain a payoff of one are when other players rewrite the deviations word
(at most 2m stages), and once every m stages for k   2m stages. The average payoff for player i is thus no
more than
2m+ k 2m /m
k
=
2m+K  2
Km
 
2
K
+
1
m
  x
i 
because xi  2/m, and K  2m.  
Remark 3.3. Theorem 3.1 easily extends to a (2n + 1)-player minority game (each player has to choose
between L and R and receives a payoff of one if she is in the minority room, and zero otherwise). However, the
proof relies heavily on the speciﬁc properties of the game and signal function. Because convergence of   Ek to
E  is not always guaranteed—see the introduction or the earlier version of this paper (Renault et al. [32])—a
challenging and open problem is to characterize limk   Ek.
4. Private equilibria. The following proposition shows that under bounded recall, the set of private-equi-
librium payoffs is strictly larger than the set of public-equilibrium payoffs. Furthermore, private equilibria may
not be equilibria of the unbounded-recall—i.e., uniform—equilibria, and we ﬁnd a private equilibrium payoff
for k =3, which lies outside E .
Proposition 4.1. (a) E2 differs from   E2 because  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3  E2\   E2.
(b) In the minority game  3/7 3/7 0  E3, and thus E3   E .
This last point is proved by explicitly constructing an equilibrium   =   1  2  3  of  3 with payoff
 3/7 3/7 0 . The proof is quite lengthy and involved and seems to indicate that more general results in this
direction are quite hard to obtain.
As mentioned in the introduction, Mailath et al. [26] and Kandori and Obara [19] compare the behavior of
public and private strategies in games with public signals and unbounded recall. Proposition 4.1 does something
of that sort in a bounded-recall framework.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (a) First remark that with private strategies player i can play a periodic
sequence of actions with cycle RLL by using a strategy that relies only on her own actions, and does not regard
public signals whatsoever. Therefore, consider the strategy proﬁle obtained by cycling
R L L
L R L
L L R
where the ith row indicates the strategy of the ith player. This is clearly an equilibrium of  2: It is a repetition
of one-stage Nash equilibria so that no player can increase her stage payoff by deviating, and further, because
players do not regard public signals, no player can change the future behavior of her opponents. The associated
payoff is then  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3 . By Proposition 3.2(c), the payoff  
1
3 
1
3 
1
3  is not in   E2.2
(b) We construct an equilibrium   =  1  2  3  of  3 with payoff  3/7 3/7 0 . Given strategies of recall 3,
the action played by a player at some stage depends only on her last three actions and on the last three public
signals. The last 3 t actions or signals at time t will be called available.
2 An alternative construction was suggested by a referee who showed that this payoff can be obtained by an equilibrium where only one
player plays a private strategy.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Last own actions P1 P2 P3
LLL R R L
LLR R L L
LRL L R L
LRR L L L
RLL L L L
RLR L R L
RRL R L L
RRR L L L
Figure 6. Actions when the last three signals are LLL.
The proﬁle   is deﬁned as follows:
(a) If at least one available public signal is R, then   recommends to each player to switch rooms, i.e., to
play L if she played R at the previous stage, and vice versa.
(b) Assume now that all available public signals are L.
(b1) Regarding the ﬁrst three stages, as long as the public signal is L,   recommends playing as follows:
Stage   1 2 3
P1 L L R
P2 R L L
P3 L R L
For example, the symbol R in line P3 means that at stage 2,  3 asks player 3 to play R if the public signal of
stage 1 was L.
(b2) At every stage t   3, if the last three public signals are L, then each player i    1 2 3  plays the
action f i ai
t 3 ai
t 2 ai
t 1   L R  where ai
t  denotes the action played by player i at stage t , and the functions
f 1, f 2, f 3 are described in Figure 6.
At the intersection of column P2 and line RLL, the symbol L means that f 2 RLL  = L, i.e., at any stage
t  3, if the last three public signals were L, and the last actions played by player 2 were R (at stage t  3), L
(at stage t  2), and L (at stage t  1), then player 2 following  2 should play L. This ends the deﬁnition of  .
The proof is complete once Lemma 4.1 below is proved.  
Lemma 4.1. (a) The payoff induced by   is  3/7 3/7 0 .
(b) The strategy   is an equilibrium of  3.
Proof. (a) Assume that   is played. The induced play can be represented in Figure 7.
The action of a player in the minority room, if any, is emphasized with a circle. The public signal is L at
every stage, the induced play eventually has period 7 (one can see a period from stage 3 to stage 9), and the
induced payoff is  3/7 3/7 0 .
(b) This part is a direct consequence of the next three lemmas, where the best reply condition is checked for
every player.  
Lemma 4.2. In  3,  3 is a best reply against   3.
Proof. Let  3 be any strategy of player 3 in  3
3. It is necessary to prove that  3  3   3     3    = 0.
Assume in the sequel that   3   3  is played, and distinguish two cases.
Stage   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Action P1 L L   R   R L   R L L L   R   R L   R      
Action P2   R L L L   R L   R   R L L L   R L      
Action P3 L   R L L L L L L L L L L L      
Public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L      
Figure 7. Actions induced by 6.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Case 1. Assume that the sequence of public signals never contains the symbol R. Then the sequence of
actions played by players 1 and 2 is the same as in Figure 7. Therefore, at stages 3, 4, 5, and 6 player 3 is
playing L (otherwise, the public signal will be R at some stage). Because  3 has recall 3, it implies that player 3
will play L at every stage t  3. Because L is at each stage the majority room,  3  3   3 =0.
Case 2. Assume that at some stage the public signal is R. Consider the ﬁrst stage ¯ t where this happens. Up
to stage ¯ t, the actions played by player 1 and 2 correspond to Figure 7, so at stage ¯ t it is not possible that
both players 1 and 2 play R. Consequently, at stage ¯ t: either players 1 and 3 play R and player 2 plays L, or
players 2 and 3 play R and player 1 plays L. Recall now that  1 and  2 ask players 1 and 2 to change rooms
whenever one of the available signals is R.
As long as one of the available public signals is R, players 1 and 2 will exchange rooms at each stage, and
because players 1 and 2 are not in the same room, the payoff for player 3 will be zero. Therefore, to get out of
this punishment phase, player 3 has to play three consecutive times L to induce three consecutive signals L. As
a result, it is possible to assume w.l.o.g. that there exists a stage t where the situation is shown in Figure 8.
If player 3 plays R at stage t +3, then at this stage players 1 and 3 play R and player 2 plays L or players 2
and 3 play R and player 1 plays L, and player 3 does not get out of the punishment phase where players 1
and 2 exchange rooms at each stage. Player 3’s payoff is zero at each stage.
Therefore, let us assume that player 3 plays L at stage t +3. However, because  3 has recall 3, player 3 will
continue to play L as long as the public signal is L. The situation at the end of stage t + 2 is similar to the
situation at the end of stage 7 (left table) or stage 6 (right table) of Figure 8, and from this stage on player 3
will be in the majority room and (the L room) hence will also have payoff zero. So,  3  3   3 =0.  
Lemma 4.3. In  3,  1 is a best reply against   1.
Proof. Let  1 be a strategy proﬁle of player 1 in  1
3. It is necessary to prove that  1  1   1   1   =3/7 
Assume that   1   1  is played. Two cases are possible.
Case 1. Assume that at each stage the public signal is L. Then the situation is as follows:
Stage   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Action P1 L L X Y L Z L L
Action P2   R L L L   R L   R   R L L L
Action P3 L   R L L L L L L L L L      
Public signal L L L L L L L L L L L      
with X, Y, Z in  L R .
If  X Y = L L , then player 1 only plays L because  1 has recall 3, and  1  1   1 =0  3/7. Therefore,
it is possible to assume w.l.o.g. that  X Y  = L L . The same argument shows that Z =R.
If  X Y  =  L R , then the actions played by player 1 are LLLRLRLL. Because signals are assumed to be
L at each stage, the next action of player 1 depends on her available actions only, and one sees that in this word
the ﬁrst appearance of LRL is followed by R and the second is followed by L. This sequence of actions is thus
unachievable with recall 3. If  X Y = R L , then player 1 plays LLR LLR LLR LLR        But then at some
stage the public signal will be R, yielding a contradiction.
Stage   t t +1 t +2 t +3
Action P1 L R L L a 
Action P2 R L R R b 
Action P3 L L L
Public signal L L L
or
Stage   t t +1 t +2 t +3
Action P1 R L R L c 
Action P2 L R L R d 
Action P3 L L L
Public signal L L L
Figure 8. A possible deviation of player 3.
Notes.  a Because f 1 L R L =L (see Figure 6),
 b because f 2 R L R =R,
 c because f 1 R L R =L,
 d because f 2 L R L =R.Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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The last case to consider is  X Y = R R . In such a case:
Stage   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Action P1 L L   R   R L   R L L T U
Action P2   R L L L   R L   R   R L L L   R L   R   R L
Action P3 L   R L L L L L L L L L L L L L L      
Public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L      
If T =R, then player 1 plays the following sequence with period 6: LLRRLR LLRRLR LLRRLR        Because
player 2 plays a sequence with period 7 and gcd 6 7  = 1, at some stage the signal will be R, yielding a
contradiction. Therefore, T =L.
Now if U =L, the memory of player 1 at stage 10 is the same as at stage 9. She will thus always play L and
get a payoff of zero. If U =R, this is exactly as in the case of Figure 7, and  1  1   1 =3/7.
Case 2. Assume that there exists some stage where the public signal is R. It is possible to proceed as in the
proof of Lemma 4.2 (Case 2). Because f 2 L R L =f 2 R L R =R and f 3 L R L =f 3 R L R =L, also,
in this case  1  1   1 =0  3/7.  
Lemma 4.4. In  3,  2 is a best reply against   2.
Proof. Let  2 in  2
3 be a strategy of player 2. It is necessary to show that  2  2   2    3/7 =  2   .
Assume for the sake of contradiction that  2  2   2 >3/7.
Claim. It cannot happen that at some stage both players 1 and 3 play R.
Assume on the contrary that there exists a ﬁrst stage ¯ t where both player 1 and player 3 play R. Necessarily,
¯ t  3, and because player 3 plays R at ¯ t, ¯ t cannot be the ﬁrst stage where the signal is R. Therefore, there exists
some stage ˆ t < ¯ t such that the signal at stage ˆ t is R, and the signal at every stage t, ˆ t <t < ¯ t, is L.
Because player 3 plays R at ¯ t, then ¯ t   ˆ t +3. By deﬁnition of ¯ t, at stage ˆ t: the signal is R, either player 1
or player 3 play L, and player 2 plays R. So after stage ˆ t, players 1 and 3 start to exchange rooms, and this
contradicts the fact that both player 1 and player 3 play R at ¯ t.
Given this claim, two cases and several subcases are possible.
Case 1. Assume that eventually the sequence of signals only contains L. There exists ¯ t with ut  2   2 =L
for all t   ¯ t.
Then for each stage t   ¯ t +3, player 3 will play L (see Figure 6), and given the deﬁnition of f 1, player 1
will eventually play the following sequence with period 7: LLLRRLR LLLRRLR LLLRRLR       
Because it was assumed that  2  2   2  > 3/7, there must exist seven consecutive stages among which
player 2 is in the minority room for at least four stages. Because the majority room should be L from some
stage on, the sequence played by player 2 depends only on her own actions, and therefore has the period of at
most 23 = 8. One can then check that the only possibility for player 2 to win at least four times out of seven
is to play the periodic sequence RRRLLRL RRRLLRL RRRLLRL        so there must exist t   ¯ t such that the
play is:
Stage   t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 +13
Action P1 L L L   R   R L   R L L L   R   R L   R
Action P2   R   R   R L L   R L   R   R   R L L   R L
Action P3 L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
Public signal L L L L L L L L L L L L L L
This sequence of actions of player 2 will be denoted by   in the sequel.
Subcase 1.a. Assume that all signals are L. Then the situation is as follows.
Stage   1 2 3 4
Action P1 L L R R
Action P2 X L L L
Action P3 L R L L
Public signal L L L L
It must be X = R; otherwise, player 2 only plays L and  2  2   2  = 0. Therefore, player 2, at stage 4, plays
L after RLL. This is not compatible with the sequence  .Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Subcase 1.b. Assume that there exists a last stage ¯ t where the public signal is R. Because player 1 and
player 3 never play R at the same time, two possibilities can occur at stage ¯ t.
Subsubcase 1.b.1. If player 1 plays R at stage ¯ t, then
Stage   ¯ t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7
Action P1 R L a  R a  L a  L b  L c  R d 
Action P2 R L e  L e  L e  X Y L e 
Action P3 L R a  L a  R a  L L L L
Public signal R L L L L L L L
 a Player 1 and player 3 change rooms after a public signal R,
 b because f 1 L R L =L,
 c because f 1 R L L =L,
 d because f 1 L L L =R,
 e by assumption, the signal has to be L at every stage   ¯ t +1.
If X = L, then player 2 will always play L and have a payoff of zero. Therefore, X = R. Then Y = L
because of the periodic sequence  . However, using   again, at stage ¯ t +6 player 2 should play R, yielding a
contradiction.
Subsubcase 1.b.2. If player 3 plays R at stage ¯ t, then
Stage   ¯ t +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
Action P1 L R L R L L L R R L
Action P2 R L L L X Y Z L L
Action P3 R L R L L L L L L
Public signal R L L L L L L L L L
It must be that X = R; otherwise, player 2 will always play L after ¯ t. The sequence   then gives Y = L, and
Z =R. However, by   again at stage ¯ t +7, player 2 should play R, yielding a contradiction.
Case 2. It remains to consider the case with an inﬁnite number of stages where the public signal is R.
Take any interval of stages  t1        t2 , where t1 < t2, ut1  2   2  = ut2  2   2  = R, and for every t  
 t1 +1        t2  1 , ut  2   2  = L. To conclude the proof, it is sufﬁcient to show that the average payoff of
player 2 at stages t1        t2  1 is at most 3/7.
Assume by contradiction that it is not the case, i.e., assume that the average payoff of player 2 at stages
t1        t2   1 is greater than 3/7. Because player 1 and player 3 never play R at the same stage, at stage t1,
either players 1 and 2 play R; player 3 plays L; or players 3 and 2 play R, player 1 plays L. In each case,
players 1 and 3 are going to exchange rooms at stages t1+1, t1+2, and t1+3, so the payoff of player 2 is zero
at each stage t in  t1 t1 +1 t1 +2 t1 +3 . It was assumed that the average payoff of player 2 between stage t1
and stage t2 1 is greater than 3/7. This implies that t2  t1+8. Therefore, the signal at stages t1+1        t1+7
is L. Two cases are possible.
Subcase 2.a. At stage t1, player 3 plays L.
Stage   t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 ··· t2
Action P1 R L   R L L L   R   R L ··· R
Action P2 R L L L X Y L L Z ··· R
Action P3   L   R L   R L L L L L ···   L
Public signal R L L L L L L L L ··· R
By a standard argument X =R (otherwise, player 2 plays only L and gets 0). If Y =L, then, because player 2
has recall 3,
t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10 +11 +12 +13 +14 +15 t2
P1 R L   R L L L   R   R L   R L L L   R R L R
P2 R L L L   R L L L   R L L L   R L L L R
P3   L   R L   R L L L L L L L L L L L L   L
signal R L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L RRenault, Scarsini, and Tomala: A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
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Then t2 =t1 +16, and the average payoff of player 2 is 3/16. Therefore, to conclude subcase 2.a., it remains
to consider the case when Y =R.
Stage   t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9
Action P1 R L   R L L L   R   R L R
Action P2 R L L L   R   R L L Z T
Action P3   L   R L   R L L L L L L
Public signal R L L L L L L L L
Whatever Z is, we have T =R. Thus, t2 =t1 +9, and the average payoff of player 2 is at most 3/9.
Subcase 2.b. At stage t1, player 1 plays L.
Stage   t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Action P1   L   R L   R L L L   R   R L d  R f 
Action P2 R L L L   R
 a 
Y Z L L b 
Action P3 R L   R L L L L L L L d  L f 
Public signal R L L L L L L L L c  L e 
 a standard argument because player 2 has recall 3,
 b the only possibility is L, otherwise there is no chance for the average payoff of player 2 to be greater
than 3/7. Furthermore,  b  implies  c ,  c  implies  d ,  d  implies  e , and  e implies  f .
Now,  Y Z = L L  is not possible because player 2 would play LLLL at stages t1+5 t1+6 t1+7 t1+8.
The case  Y Z  =  L R  also is not possible, because player 2 would have to play the same action at both
stages t1 +6 and t1 +8.
Assume that  Y Z = R L . Then,
Stage   t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Action P1   L   R L   R L L L   R   R L R
Action P2 R L L L   R   R L L L   R R
Action P3 R L   R L L L L L L L   L
Public signal R L L L L L L L L L R
Here t2 = t1 +10. The average payoff for player 2 at stages t1 t1 +1        t2  1 is only 3/10. The last case to
consider is  Y Z = R R .
Stage   t1 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
Action P1   L   R L   R L L L   R   R L R
Action P2 R L L L   R   R   R L L X  Y  
Action P3 R L   R L L L L L L L L
Public signal R L L L L L L L L L
Necessarily Y   =R, and t2 =t1 +10. The average payoff for player 2 is then at most 4/10 (<3/7).  
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